<4/18> Business Week 4/26号のカバーストーリーは、Boston RedsoxとNew York YankeesのRivalryについてだ。いかにこの2チームのRivalryが全米で重要な意味を持っているかがわかる。
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_17/b3880001_mz001.htm
題して「Breaking The Curse」。Curseは「呪い」の意味。「バンビーノの呪い」という。
「Eminently rational, he is not someone who believes, as do so many in Boston, in the Curse of the Bambino: that the team's soul-crushing, 85-year dry spell without a World Series championship is punishment for what was certainly the worst baseball deal ever, the decision to sell Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees just before the 1920 season.」
「ボストンがベーブ・ルースをニューヨークに売った」という史上最悪のデシジョンの「呪い」が今もボストンにはまとわりついて、1920年以降26回もNew Yorkがワールドシリーズを制したのに対して、ボストンは一度もワールドシリーズ制覇ができていない。
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_17/b3880003_mz001.htm
「呪い」といえば、シカゴ・カブスにまとわりついた「ビリー・ゴートの呪い」というのもある。
去年は、シカゴもボストンもワールドシリーズ直前にこの「呪い」によって失速してしまった。「呪い」は今も健在なのである。
シカゴもボストンも、今オフは素晴らしい補強をした。ボストン対シカゴの「呪い」対決のワールドシリーズも十分に今年はあり得るのである。
このカバーストーリーは、ボストンのオーナーJohn Henry
「John W. Henry, the 54-year-old principal owner of the Boston Red Sox, was born with a genius for numbers. A college dropout, he made billions of dollars for himself and clients over the course of two decades as one of the premier players in the global futures markets.」
がボストンの「呪い」を解くべく、1918年以来一度も制することができていないワールドシリーズを制することができるか、というストーリーだ。
「Stoic as he is, even Henry couldn't bear what happened last Oct. 16, when, from his seat beside the Red Sox dugout in Yankee Stadium, he watched Boston lose the deciding seventh game of the American League Championship. "I was very angry," he says with typical understatement, recalling how Sox Manager Grady Little had chosen to leave in his obviously tiring ace pitcher, Pedro Martinez, deep into the eighth inning. The Sox held a three-run lead and were just five outs from the World Series. But Little kept Martinez on the mound until the Yankees tied the score, setting the stage for a game-winning homer by Aaron Boone in the bottom of the 11th. To some fans, it was the Sox' most painful loss in a long history of painful losses.」
は、去年のALCS第7戦の采配によってJohn HenryによってGrady Little前監督が切られた経緯の解説。確かにALCS第7戦は、痛い敗戦の歴史の中でも最も痛かった敗戦だった。
John Henryの経歴から、MoneyBallなどでおなじみになったデータ重視の考え方を徹底するのは、ボストンにとって当然の成り行きだったが、Johnが他と違うのは、その上でスーパースターにもカネを出すという戦略。
「Plenty of other teams are trying to mine the reams of data generated by the game, but Henry, more than almost anyone else around, is perfectly suited to this bloodless, brainy approach. He is also the first owner to combine a commitment to this new discipline with a willingness to spend big, very big, on stars. "The Red Sox are a more dangerous team," says Steve Moyer, president of Baseball Info Solutions, a sabermetrics company that Henry has hired. "They're like the A's with money."」
その方針から、シリングとフォールクというスーパースターを獲得するわけだが、さらに地味ながらポーキー・リースも獲得してトッド・ウォーカーをリプレイス。その理由はデータ重視ゆえのもの。
「But the team also signed Pokey Reese, who hit just .215 last year. Why? Because his glove is golden -- and a detailed analysis showed the high-scoring Sox needed fielding more than they needed the big bat of Todd Walker, whom Reese replaced. "This may be the best Red Sox team ever assembled," brags Henry.」
ボストンは今年がピークであり、今年は絶対にワールドシリーズを制したいのである。
「The truth of the matter is that the Sox are hitting a wall. "We're maxing out on everything," Henry admits. Every game is already sold out. Ticket prices are the highest in the majors. That means the Sox payroll has gone about as high as it can, which could have a severe impact on the team as early as next year. Four of the Sox' biggest stars -- Martinez, pitcher Derek Lowe, shortstop Nomar Garciaparra, and catcher Jason Varitek -- could become free agents at the end of the season. All are demanding huge new contracts, but "we can't afford to re-sign all of them," warns Lucchino.」
今オフで、マルティネス、ロー、ガルシアパーラ、ベリテックが抜ければ、チームは再構築モードに入らざるを得ない。
「That's why sabermetrics has become such an important part of the Boston strategy. Henry is not a guy who goes in for half-measures. After buying the Red Sox, he first tried to sign Billy Beane. When that fell through, he did the next best thing: He hired Bill James, the writer and baseball thinker who invented sabermetrics, as senior baseball operations adviser.」
そこでさらにデータ重視が重要になってくる。
「The team was lavishing more than $6 million a year on both Jose Offerman and John Valentin, two mediocre infielders. Using sabermetrics, the Sox have cut the overpaid and hired the underemployed: Last year they picked up slugger David Ortiz for just $1.25 million and Kevin Millar for $2 million. Both became stars.」
データ重視で、凡庸で高い選手を切り、評価の低い実力のある選手を獲得して年俸総額を抑える。ここで$2milで契約したと書かれているKevin Millarは中日との契約をホゴにして、突然帰国してしまったあのミラーだ。メジャーではもう活躍できないと腹を括っていたから中日と契約したわけだが、Bostonの目に叶い復帰して、昨季は大活躍した。
New Yorkはデータ重視の姿勢を取らないチームだが、2010年までに$500milもの契約をコミットしているという。
「But the Sox have been far more prudent than the Yankees, who make less use of sabermetrics and whose payroll is bloated with more than $500 million in guaranteed contracts through 2010. "No sabermetrically oriented team would ever have signed Jason Giambi to the backloaded deal the Yankees did," says Pappas. "He's already 33 and has injury issues." The Yankees have promised him more than $20 million a year from 2006 to 2008.」
データ重視するチームならジアンビとの複数年契約など絶対にしなかったろうと。これには強く同感する。